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This article examines the extent to which electoral selection based on candidate quality alone can account for
the pattern of re-election rates in the US Senate. In the absence of officeholder benefits, electoral selection is
simulated using observed dropout rates from 1946 to 2010. This provides a benchmark for the re-election rate
that would be generated by incumbent quality advantage alone. The simulation delivers a re-election rate that
is almost identical to the observed rate prior to 1980, at around 78 per cent. In the later subsample,
quality-based selection generates a re-election rate that is seven percentage points lower than observed. The
divergence in the re-election rates in the later subsample is consistent with the findings of vote margin studies
that indicate rising incumbency advantage due to officeholder benefits. In addition, it is found here that the
quality-based selection first-term re-election rate is significantly lower than the observed first-term re-election
rate. This result supports sophomore surge vote margin studies of officeholder benefits.
Keywords: congressional elections; re-election rate; incumbency advantage; electoral selection
Introduction
Incumbents in the US Congress are typically re-elected.1 In an environment with significant
officeholder benefits, incumbents who would otherwise be defeated may be able to retain
their seats. High re-election rates are therefore often taken as prima facie evidence of a poorly
functioning political system where lesser quality incumbents are not replaced. However, the
literature on congressional races does not provide a yardstick to gauge what constitutes an
overly high re-election rate. Even in the absence of officeholder benefits, it is likely that an
incumbent would be re-elected since he or she must be of a relatively high quality given their
previous electoral success. Incumbents who have served many terms have defeated multiple
opponents and so are likely to be of very high quality. Hence their re-election rates are likely
to be very high. In this article we examine the extent to which electoral selection based on
candidate quality alone can account for the pattern of re-election rates in the US Senate. The
counterfactual setup may provide a simple benchmark for the re-election rate in the absence
of officeholder benefits.
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Disentangling quality-based selection effects from direct officeholder benefits such as superior
media exposure, franking privileges and fundraising advantages and indirect officeholder
benefits such as entry deterrence of high-quality challengers can be difficult as the full extent
of candidate quality is typically unobservable. A strand of the literature attacks this problem
directly. For example, Stone and Simas (2010) and Stone et al. (2010) use expert informants
to score incumbents and challengers in the US House of Representatives electoral contests;
and McCurley and Mondak (1995) compile indicators of competence and integrity. However,
one can never be certain that all aspects of candidate quality are addressed and failing to fully
control for quality may lead to biased estimates of officeholder benefits (Gelman and King,
1990). To bypass the problem, Levitt and Wolfram (1997) exploit information contained in
contests of repeat challengers; Lee (2008), Uppal (2009; 2010) and Redmond and Regan
(2013) employ regression discontinuity design, making use of the electoral history of bare-
winners and bare-losers who generate similar electoral support.2
We take a simple but complementary approach. We examine a counterfactual framework
where candidate quality is the sole determinant of electoral success. As in Dix and Santore
(2002), we consider candidate ‘quality’ to be the immutable characteristics of a candidate that
are desired by voters. In the terminology of Adams et al. (2011), our definition of ‘quality’
captures ‘character valence’ based on traits such as integrity, competence and diligence.3 We
assume that candidate quality is perfectly observable by the voter and the median voter
strictly prefers the higher quality candidate. We simulate an electoral process where the
higher quality candidate wins irrespective of incumbency status. The simulation is calibrated
using the observed dropout rates in the US Senate over the period 1946–2010. Re-election
rates from the simulation are then compared to the observed re-election rates in the US
Senate across terms in office and across time periods. Prior to 1980 the re-election rate from
the simulation is almost identical to the observed rate, at 78 per cent. From 1980 to 2010,
however, the rates diverge; while the observed re-election rate is 85 per cent, the simulated
rate based on candidate quality is only 78 per cent. The seven percentage point divergence in
the later part of the sample may be indicative of an increase in electoral stagnation in excess
of what quality-based selection would generate.
The methodology of this simulation analysis is quite different from that employed by regres-
sion analysis vote margin studies. Therefore, the results can provide an indirect robustness
check. The divergence in the observed and simulated re-election rates from 1980 to 2010 is
consistent with the findings of vote margin studies that indicate rising incumbency advantage.
Moreover, we find that the divergence in the re-election rates is greatest for first-term
senators. This result supports the findings of sophomore surge vote margin studies.
The next section provides a brief discussion of closely related literature. The ensuing sections
present the setup of the simulation, describe the data, summarise the results, and conduct a
sensitivity analysis before the final section provides our conclusions.
Related literature
While the literature on congressional races typically focuses on vote shares rather than
re-election rates, Jacobson (1987) argues that what matters most is winning or losing, and not
the size of the victory. However, re-election contains less information than vote margin since
the former is dichotomous while the latter is continuous. Therefore, Ansolabehere and
Snyder (2002) suggests that studying the margin enjoyed by the candidate due to incumbency
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status is the first step to understanding re-election rates. Depending on the methodology used,
since the 1980s incumbency advantage is estimated to be around 4 per cent vote share for
low-level state offices and around 8 per cent vote share for high-level federal and statewide
offices (see Hirano and Snyder, 2009). While vote margins are clearly closely related to
re-election rates, the relationship is not necessarily one-to-one. Jacobson (1987) shows that
from the 1950s to the 1980s vote shares of House incumbents increased, but there was no rise
in the re-election rates. Likewise, Garand (1991) and Jewel and Breaux (1988) demonstrate
that the vote margins of incumbents grew substantially in state legislative races in the 1970s
and 1980s, but re-election rates barely increased. Hence we analyse re-election rates directly.
Carey et al. (2000), Stone et al. (2004; 2010), Diermeier et al. (2005) and Gowrisankaran
et al. (2008) discuss the factors that influence the re-election rate. We take a stab at a different
question and examine how much of the observed re-election rate can be accounted for by
incumbent quality alone.
The closest work is Zaller (1998) on House elections. Methodologically, our article is very
similar to Zaller (1998). However Zaller (1998) investigates the relative importance of forces
external to the candidates – the role of non-skill factors, thereby introducing a number of
features other than candidate quality into the framework which are designed to increase its
realism. Here, on the other hand, we are interested in establishing a benchmark re-election
rate in the absence of officeholder benefits that would result if candidate quality were all that
mattered. So a key aspect where the analyses differ is in our treatment of indirect officeholder
benefits. In Zaller (1998), the existence of an incumbent reduces the competitiveness of the
opposition primary and hence the resulting re-election rate incorporates an implicit scare off
effect – on average, the opposition fields a weaker candidate when faced with an incumbent.
Here we analyse electoral stagnation generated by selection based solely on quality, absent
any source of officeholder benefits including scare-off effects which may lead to significant
incumbency advantage. Hence we assume that the competitiveness of the opposition party’s
primary is unaltered by the existence or non-existence of an incumbent.
Simulation setup
We start with an open seat contest where two candidates run for office. The qualities of both
candidates are drawn independently from the same continuous distribution function F(q).
Each candidate’s quality score (qi) is permanent over the life time of his political career. The
electoral outcome is deterministic given the quality scores of the candidates; the candidate
with the higher quality wins the election and becomes a first-term senator. Since the cumu-
lative distribution function (c.d.f.) is continuous, ties occur with zero probability. At the end
of his first term the incumbent either drops out with an exogenous probability p1 or runs for
re-election with probability (1 – p1). If he drops out, then there is a new open seat and the
process repeats. If he runs for re-election, his quality score remains unaltered and a new
challenger contests the seat. The challenger’s quality is randomly drawn from F(q) and the
election goes to whoever has higher quality.4 If the incumbent is defeated, we record a ‘defeat’
for a first-term senator. If the incumbent wins we record a ‘re-election’ for a first-term senator.
If the senator goes on to serve a second term, at the end of the second term he either drops
out with exogenous probability p2 or reruns with probability (1 – p2). If the incumbent wins,
we record a ‘re-election’ of a second-term incumbent. If the incumbent loses, we record a
‘defeat’ of a second-term incumbent; the challenger becomes a new first-term officeholder
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and the process continues with the new incumbent. We follow this process for 500 million
elections resulting in precise estimates of the re-election rates implied by the framework for
each tenure of an incumbent.
Any quality distribution function F(q) with continuous c.d.f. is permitted.5 For instance, F(q)
may be the result of a primary system. If each of the k candidates in the primary has quality
drawn from a distribution G(q), then F(q) will be the distribution of the kth order statistic of
k draws from G(q). If the number of candidates in the primary is stochastic then the
probability density function (p.d.f.) implied by F(q) may be multipeaked.6
Note that the electoral selection in the simulation abstracts from scare-off effects. In elections
where the incumbent reruns, drawing challenger quality from the same distribution as used
for open seat contests implies that the existence of an incumbent does not reduce the
competitiveness of the opposition party’s primary. Scare-off effects can arise from direct
officeholder benefits, where the electoral benefits of incumbency discourage high-quality
challengers. Quality-based scare-off effects may also exist where potential challengers are
deterred from running against high-quality incumbents as they view their re-election pros-
pects as too low. Potential challengers may also be reluctant to challenge high-quality
incumbents if they intrinsically value having a high-quality politician in office as in Stone
et al. (2004) and Adams et al. (2011).
The critical set of parameters of the simulation are the incumbents’ dropout rates p1, p2, ... for
each term. These may differ for different terms in office. We employ the observed US Senate
dropout rates from 1946 to 2010. Since the problem is identical at each open seat, it has a
recursive structure. However, because there are an infinite number of possible states (the term
of the current incumbent and the number of elections since the last open seat) we calculate
the re-election rates via simulation.
Data
Each US state is represented by two senators, who can serve unlimited six-year terms.
Elections are staggered with approximately one-third of the Senate seats up for election every
two years. Data for US Senate elections from 1946 to 2010 is garnered from the Office of the
Clerk of the US House of Representatives.7 Biographical details for individual senators are
obtained from the Congressional Biographical Directory. For each election we have informa-
tion on the names of senators and challengers contesting the election, the election outcome,
whether the incumbent was re-elected or defeated and an indicator for open-seat elections.
In addition, the data set contains information on how senators initially entered office: by
general election, appointment or special election. When an incumbent senator dies or resigns
before the end of his term in office, the governor of the state makes an appointment to fill the
vacancy until a special election can be held.8 The appointed senator can then decide whether
to contest the special election or retire. In our counterfactual setup, elections serve to weed
out low-quality candidates and holding office does not in itself provide any electoral benefits.
Hence, in our data, candidates who run after being appointed to office are not coded as
incumbents as they have not yet gone through the crucible of an election. This is different
from the usual treatment in studies with incumbency advantage where they are treated as
incumbents since in those studies holding office provides an electoral advantage.
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The data contains a total of 1,154 elections, and 268 of these were open-seat elections.9 This
leaves 886 elections that were contested by an elected incumbent seeking re-election.10 The
re-election rate in these 886 elections is equal to 81.72 per cent.
An incumbent senator can either be re-elected, defeated or he can simply drop out. Table 1
gives the observed dropout rates of incumbents over the period of study. The longest tenure
of any incumbent in the data is 51.5 years of service in the Senate.
Incumbents may drop out due to outside opportunities in the private or public sector, poor
health and death. The simulated setup takes these observed dropout rates as exogenous
dropout probabilities. This is different from Zaller (1998), where dropout rates are assumed to
be zero until 34 years in service (equivalent to just under six terms if applied to US senators).
Both approaches have the potential to suffer from bias due to their treatment of dropout rates.
With no interim dropout, high-quality incumbents keep rerunning, which raises the simu-
lated re-election rate. In our simulation, incumbents may drop out before retirement. But
note that our dropout probabilities do not depend on quality; in reality, an incumbent may
drop out to pre-empt defeat if she observes a higher quality challenger. Hence if strategic
retirement in anticipation of defeat were prevalent in the data, the re-election rates from our
simulation would be biased downwards. Nevertheless, studies cast doubt on the empirical
importance of strategic retirement in the analysis of re-election rates. From 1968 to 1978,
Peters and Welch (1980) find that House incumbents who were involved in a corruption
scandal were no more likely to drop out than those who were not. Ansolabehere and Snyder
(2004) use term limits as an instrument to correct for strategic retirement; traditional esti-
mates of incumbency advantage that do not take strategic retirement into account are only
marginally different from estimates that do.
Simulation results
Simulations are run for 500 million iterations yielding negligible standard errors for the
simulated re-election rates. Hence differences from actual re-election rates reflect either
model misspecification or chance in the actual election process rather than imprecision in the
estimates.
Table 2 summarises the observed and the simulated re-election rates for each term of office
during the period 1946–2010, as well as the overall observed and simulated re-election rates.
The simulated re-election rates are monotonically increasing in the number of terms. For an
incumbent to reach a high term in office, she must have defeated numerous challengers along
Table 1: Observed dropout rates from the US Senate, 1946–2010 (in percentiles)
Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 Term 8 Term 9
12.00 20.26 31.03 35.19 28.00 48.15 54.55 25.00 100.00
n = 425 n = 306 n = 203 n = 108 n = 50 n = 27 n = 11 n = 4 n = 2
Note: n is the number of senators who were elected to at least x terms.
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the way. Therefore, on average, candidates that reach higher terms have high quality and as
such have a higher probability of re-election, leading to electoral stagnation.11 Note that
incumbent-quality advantage is quite high even for first-term senators, which results in a
72.61 per cent first-term re-election rate in the simulation. First-term senators who enter
office by contesting an open seat are re-elected two thirds of the time, but the first-term
senators who enter office by defeating an incumbent are, on average, of exceptionally high
quality. Hence their re-election rate is correspondingly higher, bringing up the overall first-
term re-election rate.
The simulated overall re-election rate (78.16 per cent) is close to the observed re-election rate
in the data (81.72 per cent). However, the difference (3.56 percentage points) is statistically
Table 2: Observed and simulated re-election rates in the US Senate, 1946–2010
Observed rate (%) Simulated rate (%) Difference (%)
term 1 80.21 72.61 7.60***
n = 374 n = 141.1 m
(2.06) (0.00)
Term 2 83.61 79.30 4.31
n = 244 n = 81.7 m
(2.37) (0.00)
Term 3 80.00 83.26 −3.26
n = 140 n = 44.7 m
(3.38) (0.01)
Term 4 80.00 85.89 −5.89
n = 70 n = 24.1 m
(4.78) (0.01)
Term 5 91.67 87.77 3.90
n = 36 n = 14.9 m
(4.61) (0.01)
Term 6 85.71 89.19 −3.48
n = 14 n = 6.8 m
(9.35) (0.01)
Term 7 80.00 90.27 −10.27
n = 5 n = 2.8 m
(17.89) (0.02)
Term 8 100.00 91.21 8.79
n = 3 n = 1.9 m
(−) (0.02)
Overall re-election rate 81.72 78.16 3.56**
n = 886 n = 318.1 m
(1.30) (0.00)
Notes: ** indicates significance at 5 per cent; *** indicates significance at 1 per cent. Shown beneath each point estimate is the
number of observations (n). The number of observations is measured in millions for the simulation. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses.
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significant. The benchmark generates lower electoral stagnation compared to the observed
data. This is largely driven by the first term. The simulated first-term re-election rate is 7.60
percentage points lower than the observed.
Since the simulation abstracts from all incumbency advantages other than the incumbent-
quality effect, it might be tempting to attribute the difference between the observed and
simulated re-election rates to incumbency advantage arising from direct and indirect office-
holder benefits. However, caution is called for in interpreting the results. One of the dimen-
sions in which the counterfactual setup probably diverts from reality is the term-invariant
quality of the incumbent.12 With experience, senators may get sharper in early terms and then
become more and more detached from their constituents over time, cancelling the positive
effect of further experience.13 If in reality incumbent quality increases at a decreasing rate
while the simulation assumes term-invariant quality, the re-election rates from the simulation
would be too low in early terms. This pattern is consistent with the positive differences in the
first two terms in Table 2.14
Likewise, by assuming that the distribution of candidate quality is unaffected by challenger/
open seat status the simulation abstracts from the scare-off effect. And by assuming that
challengers’ quality distribution is unaffected by the quality of the incumbent it abstracts from
competent-government motivated candidates’ lesser desire to replace high-quality incum-
bents as discussed in Stone et al. (2004) and Adams et al. (2011). Both these effects would
lead to higher re-election rates as they result in fewer high-quality challengers. Hence to the
degree that experience increases incumbent quality or that incumbents are able to scare off
high-quality challengers, attributing all of the difference between the observed and simulated
rates in the first two terms (7.60 and 4.31 per cent, respectively) to direct and indirect
officeholder benefits may be exaggerating their magnitude.
However, there is also reason to believe that simple attribution of the difference between the
simulated and observed re-election rates to officeholder benefits may understate their magni-
tude. The simulated setup assumes no partisan swings. Jacobson (1989) finds that the effect of
national partisan tides on the probability of re-election of congressional incumbents is negative
and statistically significant. With an average re-election rate of about 80 per cent, incumbents
have more to lose with partisan tides then they have to gain. A partisan swing can increase the
average win probability of the incumbents it favours by at most 20 per cent. On the other hand,
it can reduce the average win probability of the incumbents who experience a negative swing
by up to 80 per cent. The fact that the counterfactual setup assumes no partisan swings makes
the re-election rates from the simulation higher than otherwise. Incumbency advantage due to
direct and indirect officeholder benefits may be responsible for stagnation by more than the
difference between the observed and the simulated re-election rates in Table 2.
The literature exploiting vote margins indicates an increase in incumbency advantage over
time.15 In what follows, we examine re-election rates across time periods. The data is split into
two subsamples: the early years from 1946 to 1978, and the later years from 1980 to 2010.
The counterfactual setup is calibrated with the dropout rates from each subsample from
Table 3. Table 4 reports the results.
In the subsample from 1946 to 1978 the observed re-election rate in the US Senate and the
re-election rate generated from the electoral selection simulation are almost identical at
around 78 per cent. However, the rates diverge in the 1980–2010 subsample. While the
observed re-election rate is about 85 per cent, the simulated rate based on electoral selection
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is only about 78 per cent. The nearly seven percentage point difference in the later part of the
sample may be indicative of an increase in electoral stagnation for reasons other than
incumbent-quality advantage. This finding on re-election rates is consistent with the wealth
of empirical work based on vote margins that document an increase in incumbency advan-
tage. Growth in the size of government and the rise of television are among the factors cited
in the literature that may be driving forces behind an increase in incumbency advantage in
the US Congress.16
It is also possible that the higher observed re-election rate in the later subsample is due to
factors other than an increase in direct and indirect officeholder benefits. For example, growth
in partisan polarisation has been identified as a trend in US politics since the 1980s. Lang and
Pearson-Merkowitz (2013) claims that in the last two decades parties have increasingly
positioned themselves with clear ideological divides on selected issues such as the social safety
net, environmental protection and immigration. This allowed the electorate to sort them-
selves politically in a more consistent fashion which in turn led to geographical polarisation
since people live in more or less like-minded communities. As such, Democratic states may
have become more Democratic and Republican states may have become more Republican.17
Incumbents from red and blue states may not face as serious competition from the opposing
party as they would in swing states, and incumbents’ electoral prospects are favourable in the
more polarised states. Our simulated electoral selection model based on candidate quality
precludes any effect of party affiliation. If one party had an electoral advantage, candidates
Table 3: Observed dropout rates from the US Senate in two subsamples (in percentiles)
Time period Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 Term 8 Term 9
1946–1978 13.68 19.88 26.47 40.74 28.57 70.00 100.00 – –
1980–2010 9.95 20.69 35.64 29.63 27.59 35.29 44.44 25.00 100.00
Table 4: Observed and simulated re-election rates in two subsamples
Time period Observed rate (%) Simulated rate (%) Difference (%)
1946–1978 78.29 77.75 0.54
n = 456 n = 312.2 m
(1.93) (0.00)
1980–2010 85.35 78.40 6.95***
n = 430 n = 322.8 m
(1.71) (0.00)
Notes: *** indicates significance at 1 per cent. The observations are in millions for the simulation.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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from that party would be more likely to be elected in the first place and would have an easier
time fighting off challengers. Hence the simulated re-election rate would be higher than in the
baseline model. This suggests that polarisation and sorting may be contributing to the seven
percentage point re-election rate gap between the simulated and observed re-election rates in
the subsample since the 1980s.
Sensitivity of re-election rates to dropout rates
Below we carry out sensitivity analysis to explore the robustness of the results to changes in
the dropout rates. Two approaches are taken. First, we examine changes around the observed
dropout rates to see whether re-election rates are likely to vary significantly due to changes
in the actual dropout rates. Then we examine more dramatic changes in dropout rates to see
the range of re-election rates that can be supported by the framework.
First consider modest changes to the dropout rates from the baseline calibrated scenario. The
first row in Table 5A reports the dropout rate sensitivity of the simulated re-election rate for
the period 1946–2010. The exercise involves increasing the dropout rates by 10 per cent over
and above the observed rates for each of the terms. So we multiply the observed dropout rates
in Table 1 by 1.1. This yields dropout rates 13.2, 22.28, 34.13, 38.70, 30.80, 52.96, 60.00,
27.50 and 100 per cent for terms 1, 2 and so on. Naturally the simulated re-election rate based
on higher dropout rates is lower than the re-election rate employing the observed dropout
rates. Higher dropout rates imply that some of the high-quality senators retire at an early term
even though they could have won in subsequent elections; the re-election rate goes from
78.16 to 77.55 per cent. Table 5A also reports the dropout rate sensitivity of the simulated
re-election rate for the two sub-periods, employing the relevant dropout rates. An increase in
the rates by 10 per cent for each term (over and above the observed dropout rates reported
in Table 3) leads to a decline in the simulated re-election rates from 78.4 to 77.77 per cent for
the early subsample from 1946 to 1980, and from 77.75 to 77.22 per cent for the later
subsample from 1980 to 2010. In each case the change in the simulated re-election rate is
quite small. This suggests that moderate evolution of senatorial dropout rates over time is
unlikely to have significant effects on simulated re-election rates.
Even though small changes in the dropout rates around the rates observed in the Senate have
very modest effects on the simulated re-election rates, dropout rates are central to the
Table 5A: Dropout rate sensitivity analysis around the baseline
Time period Simulated re-election rates based on
observed dropout rates (baseline
calibrated simulation)
Simulated re-election rates
based on dropout rates 10%
higher than observed
1946–2010 78.16 77.55
1946–1978 78.40 77.77
1980–2010 77.75 77.22
Notes: For the time period 1946–2010, the sensitivity analysis dropout rates employed are 1.1 times the observed dropout rates in
Table 1. For the time periods 1946–1978 and 1980–2010, the sensitivity analysis dropout rates are 1.1 times the observed dropout rates
from the relevant line of Table 3.
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analysis. In order to explore the range of re-election rates that can be generated by electoral
selection, we consider more substantial changes to dropout rates. These results are tabulated
in Table 5B. Scenario 1 is the baseline simulation from the calibrated model discussed above.
Scenerio 2 assumes that incumbents never drop out (which would require that they lived
forever). In that case an incumbent is replaced only if he is defeated by a higher quality
challenger. The quality score of the incumbent senator at any round of the simulation is
weakly higher than the score of all previous incumbents. Hence the simulated re-election rate
converges to 100 per cent as the number of rounds goes to infinity. In Scenario 3, we maintain
the nine-term limit on senatorial careers but remove interim dropout for terms 1–8, senators
of high quality who make it to later terms would always run for re-election. In this scenario,
the simulated overall re-election rate increases from the baseline 78.16 per cent to 86.58 per
cent. In Scenario 4, senators serve a maximum of two terms in office (the shortest span that
allows for a re-election attempt) and first-term senators never drop out. In that case the
simulated re-election rate is 69.61 per cent, which is just slightly above the re-election rate of
66 per cent that incumbents who came to office by contesting an open seat have in their first
re-election attempt. Challengers who defeat an incumbent are, on average, of very high
quality and hence are typically subsequently re-elected. Since in this specification they do not
hang around for multiple re-election attempts, they have only a modest effect on the overall
re-election rate.
Table 5B suggests that the simulated re-election rates vary depending on the institutional
setup. If this methodology were to be applied to different legislatures, simulated rates would
respond to their specifications. For instance, in Missouri, both the State House of Representa-
tives and the State Senate have term limits: four two-year terms and two four-year terms,
respectively. We would expect to see a higher simulated re-election rate in the Missouri House
than in the Senate since high-quality incoming House incumbents are likely to be victorious
in subsequent elections. Therefore a higher observed re-election rate in the Missouri House
compared to the Missouri Senate does not indicate that the re-election rate is overly high in
the House.
In the 1980–2010 time period, the re-election rate in the US House was 94 per cent as opposed
to 85 per cent in the US Senate. The intuition gained from the simulation methodology
suggests that there is no a priori reason to expect the re-election rates to be similar since the
House and the Senate have different characteristics; one term in the House lasts only two
years as opposed to six years in the Senate. Members of the House can serve a greater number
of terms and the increased frequency of elections may lower dropout rates at each term of
office. Both of these factors would serve to increase the simulated re-election rate for the
Table 5B: Dropout rate sensitivity analysis
Scenario Simulated re-election rate (%)
1. Baseline calibrated scenario 78.16
2. No dropout (senators live forever) Converges to 100
3. No dropout until term 9 and term limit of maximum 9 terms 86.58
4. No dropout until term 2 and term limit of maximum 2 terms 69.61
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House. In addition, the minimum age requirement for the Senate is 30, while the age
requirement for the House of Representatives is 25. This may also lead to higher simulated
re-election rates in the House since a high-quality representative would have a longer
expected life span in office.18
Conclusion
This article has explored one explanation for the repeated electoral success of incumbents in
the US Congress: electoral selection based on quality. Incumbents would not have been
elected to office if they were not of relatively high quality, and hence they are typically
victorious in subsequent elections. We find that electoral selection based on quality alone may
be sufficient to explain the observed re-election rates in the US Senate in the early part of our
sample from 1946 to 1978. However, electoral selection based on quality alone fails to account
for the electoral stagnation with high rates of re-election in the later part of our sample from
1980 to 2010. Since the 1980s, observed electoral stagnation has been higher than what
would be anticipated if the only driving force of incumbents’ electoral success was candidate
quality. We are unable to account for the high re-election rates of the last thirty years using
candidate quality alone.
Indeed, if the sole reason for higher re-election rates in the later subsample were due to an
increase in incumbent-quality advantage, one would expect to observe an improvement in
the public’s opinion of the Congress. However, this is not the case. According to Gallup public
opinion polls since 1977, people’s approval of Congress and of their individual representatives
have fallen drastically.19 In 2013 Gallup polling, only 16 per cent of the voting age population
is reported to ‘approve’ of the US Congress. This approval rate is the lowest in nearly four
decades. To the question ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the way the representative from
your congressional district is handling his or her job?’, 41 per cent of the respondents replied
‘disapprove’ in 2013. The rate of disapproval recorded for the same question was 31 per cent
in 1992 and 18 per cent in 1977. One potential explanation for high re-election rates in spite
of public disapproval of incumbents may be related to rising incumbency advantage due to
officeholder benefits. Voters may find it optimal to vote for the incumbent who is likely to
occupy seats in important congressional committees as a senior politician and who has the
power to grant political favours, even though in principle they might not approve of the
politician for his or her integrity, competence and diligence.
If the gap between the actual re-election rate and the re-election rate generated by candidate
quality since 1980 is due to increased officeholder benefits, then the implications of the
simulation results are bleak for American politics. Overly high re-election rates may have
deleterious effects on social welfare. Even if the challenger is of higher quality, he may have
a smaller probability of victory than the incumbent. High-quality candidates with high
opportunity cost may be deterred from running for office because of weak electoral prospects.
This implies that some sub-optimal (on quality) senators will remain in office. Furthermore,
safer seats may induce officeholders to be less responsive to their constituents since they
would have little reason to fear defeat.
While simple, the methodology of this article is very different from that of vote margin studies
that estimate direct and indirect officeholder electoral benefits. As such, it may provide a
robustness check on the results of these studies. The fact that in the later subsample a seven
percentage point gap opened up between the actual re-election rate and the re-election rate
generated in the framework driven solely by candidate quality is consistent with the estab-
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lished finding from vote margin studies that incumbency advantage has increased in the last
30 years. The difference between the observed and simulated re-election rates is driven by
observed high first-term re-election rates, which is consistent with estimates of incumbency
advantage based on the sophomore surge approach.
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Notes
1 Matland and Studlar (2004) find that the US has the highest re-election rate among the 25 countries covered in the
study: 82 per cent from 1946 to 2010.
2 Empirical challenges remain. Using only repeat challengers leads to small sample size, especially in Senate data. In
relation to regression discontinuity design studies, Caughey and Sekhon (2011) suggest that despite the fact that
bare-winners and bare-losers generate similar electoral support, they differ on pretreatment covariates too dras-
tically to be considered as assigned randomly to treatment and control groups.
3 Stone et al. (2004) also suggest that these personal traits are likely to reflect the voter’s concept of ‘quality’.
4 Note that this implies that in our framework voters are not forward looking. In Gowrisankaran et al. (2008),
even if voters only care about quality, sophisticated voters may vote for a somewhat lower-quality challenger in
case they expect the high-quality incumbent not to run in the subsequent election. This is because voters may
anticipate future open-seat candidates to be of lower quality than the candidate who is currently challenging the
incumbent.
5 In the simulation we work with the quantile of qi. So rather than drawing an absolute level of quality, we use the
fact that F(q) is continuous to find each candidate’s position in the c.d.f. with a draw from U(0,1). Because F(q) can
be any general continuous distribution we cannot back out the absolute level of quality. But candidates with a
higher position in the c.d.f. have strictly higher quality which is sufficient to determine the winner.
6 By making specific assumptions about the distribution of quality, Zaller (1998) is able to analyse the magnitude of
the electoral selection effect when non-skill factors, termed ‘luck’, have different degrees of importance in the
electoral process. The cost of permitting any distribution of quality is that we can no longer address this important
issue. However, realistic assumptions about the primary process can generate a quite complicated implied distri-
bution of quality and we know very little about the actual distribution of candidate quality. So foregoing specific
assumptions about F(q) allows for more robust results.
7 One advantage of Senate rather than House data is the lack of gerrymandering in the Senate.
8 This is with the exception of Alaska, Oregon and Wisconsin, where the governor cannot make interim
appointments.
9 This figure includes 98 special elections, 61 of which were contested by appointed senators who ran in the election
following their appointment.
10 Note that in our setup defeated candidates do not rerun in future contests. In actuality, of the 886 elections
contested by an incumbent, 54 involved repeat challengers. Of these, 19 previously defeated candidates were
successful in their later attempt.
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11 After n elections since the last open seat, while the seat may have changed hands in the interim elections, the
quality of the current incumbent is the n+2nd order statistic of n+2 draws from F(q). Hence the expected quality
of an incumbent is increasing in the number of elections since the last open seat.
12 The assumption on term-invariant candidate quality is often employed in the literature, see e.g. Gelman and King
(1990), Levitt (1994) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997).
13 Erikson and Palfrey (1998) provide evidence for increasing vote shares of incumbents in the sophomore year,
followed by a modest increase in their junior year. However seniority is neutral on votes in higher terms. Erikson
and Palfrey’s (1998) findings are consistent with larger officeholder benefits which incumbents enjoy, especially in
early terms, due to increased name recognition. But they are also consistent with increasing incumbent quality due
to experience.
14 McCurley and Mondak (1995), Stone et al. (2004; 2010) and Stone and Simas (2010) make use of expert
informants and of the Almanac of American Politics to score candidate quality. However, measures of changes in
incumbent quality across terms in office have been more elusive. Hence it is difficult to differentiate between the
term-variant quality and the early officeholder benefit explanations for the rise in the vote margins in early terms.
15 See e.g. Hirano and Snyder (2009); Gelman and Huang (2008); Levitt and Wolfram (1997); Gelman and King
(1990).
16 The number of television channels have been increasing rapidly since 1952 and Garrett and Rhine (2006) shows
that government has been increasing in size since the early twentieth century. Fiorina (1989) argues that the larger
the government, the greater are direct officeholder benefits such as administrative office resources and improved
ability to raise campaign funds from interest groups. Prior (2006) claims that television gives incumbents free
coverage throughout their term and improves name recognition. Increase in direct officeholder benefits can lead
to challenger scare-off, indirectly increasing incumbency advantage. Levitt and Wolfram (1997) show that reduc-
tion in the relative quality of challengers since the 1960s appears to be a major contributor to the rise in
incumbency advantage.
17 A variety of causes of political polarisation have been identified, including pressures related to campaign
fundraising and more polarised pundit coverage on television in the last three decades. See Kaiser (2010) for
fundraising, and Hollander (2008) and Hetherington (2009) for television coverage.
18 The main difficulty with applying the methodology to the US House of Representatives is related to gerrymander-
ing. As pointed out by Gowrisankaran et al. (2008), it is unclear how to treat elections involving two incumbents
running against each other following redistricting in the US House. Mann and Wolfinger (1980) argue that the
Senate also differs from the House in terms of the media coverage received and the level of public interest. Hence
Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) point out that there is a higher likelihood of the voter correctly
identifying the higher quality candidate in Senate races.
19 See http://www.gallup.com/poll/165809/congressional-approval-sinks-record-low.aspx
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